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Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  
Bangladesh	  
Geof	  Wood	  	  
Abstract	  
The	  recent	  book	  on	  ‘Violence	  and	  Social	  Orders’	  by	  the	  Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  Douglass	  North	  
and	  others	  distinguishes	  between	  limited	  access	  and	  open	  access	  states.	  Most	  states	  in	  the	  
world	   remain	   limited	  access,	  or	  natural,	   states	  dominated	  by	   coalitions	  of	   elites	   capturing	  
rents	  from	  the	  society	  while	  limiting	  access	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  A	  feature	  of	  natural	  states,	  
whether	  fragile,	  basic	  or	  mature,	  is	  that	  organisations	  in	  the	  society	  are	  unable	  to	  exist	  and	  
function	   independently	   of	   the	   state,	   which	   is	   represented	   either	   by	   dominant	   individual	  
rulers	   or	   by	   a	   broader	   social	   persona	   or	   political	   class.	   There	   are	   parallel	   theoretical	  
approaches	   to	   express	   this	   lack	   of	   independence,	   for	   example:	   the	   contrast	   between	  
normative	   approach	   of	   de	   Tocqueville	   and	   the	   scepticism	   of	   Gramsci;	   the	   discourses	   on	  
syndicalism	   and	   corporatism,	   especially	   associated	   with	   authoritarian	   decades	   in	   Latin	  
America;	   and,	   for	   societies	   like	  Bangladesh,	  whether	   the	  presence	  of	  Ummah	   undermines	  
any	   prospect	   of	   conceiving	   civil	   society	   independently	   of	   the	   state.	   Being	   so	   heavily	   aid	  
dependent	   in	   the	   recent	   past,	   civil	   society	   organisations	   in	   Bangladesh,	   especially	   the	  
development	  NGOs,	  have	  also	  reflected	  a	  western	  normative	  discourse	  about	  open	  access	  
states	   and	   critical	   independence	   which	   is	   rarely	   realised	   in	   practice,	   while	   crowding	   out	  
other	  more	  indigenous	  forms	  of	  social	  capital.	  The	  paper	  will	  review	  some	  case	  examples	  of	  
failure,	  compromise	  and	  apparent	  success	  among	  CSOs	  to	  reveal	  the	  tension	  between	  voice	  
and	  loyalty,	  and	  ask	  whether	  Bangladesh	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  natural	  state	  regime	  for	  the	  
foreseeable	  future,	  combining	  elements	  of	  fascism,	  populism,	  syndicalism	  and	  tight	  control	  
of	   access	   to	   rents.	   The	   analysis	   has	   to	   be	   subtle,	   drawing	   upon	   ethnographical	   insights,	  
particular	  events	  as	  well	  as	  structural	  conditions	  and	  processes.	  




The	  discussion	  about	  civil	  society	  in	  countries	  like	  Bangladesh	  is	  a	  little	  surreal.	  Are	  we	  complicit	  
in	   seeking	   to	   analyse	   institutions	   in	   a	   society	   through	   false	   lenses,	   through	   constructs,	   which	  
have	  been	  developed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  other	  societies,	  at	  other	  times,	  far	  away?	  Is	  the	  concept	  
of	  civil	  society	  the	  appropriate	  device	  for	  observing	  civil	  society	  in	  a	  society	  where	  the	  concept	  is	  
not	  embedded	  in	  its	  values	  and	  political	  culture?	  One	  response	  to	  such	  questions	  is	  that	  we	  need	  
to	  develop	  analytic	   concepts,	  which	  are	   relative	   to	   specific	   conditions,	   and	   that	   therefore,	  we	  
need	  to	  be	  relativist.	  Thus	  we	  might	  refer	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Ummah	  as	  blurring	  a	  distinction	  
between	   state	   and	   civil	   society,	   enabling	   theocratic	   rather	   than	   democratic	   government	   and	  
governance.	   However,	   an	   opposing	   response	   is	   that	   such	   relativism	   removes	   all	   prospect	   of	  
judgement	  about	  what	  is	  good	  for	  citizens	  so	  that	  if	  the	  Taliban	  are	  the	  true	  representatives	  of	  
Afghan	  values	  and	  culture,	  then	  it	  does	  not	  matter	  that	  they	  oppress	  women.	  That	  is	  not	  a	  good	  
position	  or	  place	  to	  be	  in,	  analytically.	  Thus	  we	  need	  some	  comparative	  framework	  which	  both	  
captures	  the	  intrinsic	  or	  ontological	  essence	  of	  institutional	  practice,	  while	  enabling	  us	  to	  situate	  
a	  society	  against	  some	  universal	  principles	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  entitlements.	  Our	  suggestion	  is	  
that	  the	  recent	  book	  Violence	  and	  Social	  Orders	  by	  North,	  Wallis	  and	  Weingast	  (2009)	  is	  seminal	  
in	   providing	   this	   comparative	   framework,	   which	   facilitates	   sensitive	   contextual	   analysis	  
alongside	  the	  possibility	  of	  judgement.	  
Although	   regarded	   by	   us	   as	   seminal,	  Violence	   and	   Social	   Orders	   is	   of	   course	   in	   a	   tradition	   of	  
discourse	  about	  states	  subverting	  and	   incorporating	  organisations,	  which	  appear	  as	   if	   they	  are	  
part	   of	   civil	   society.	   Indeed	   that	   appearance	   is	   part	   of	   political	   illusion—a	   landscape	   of	  
organisations	  whose	   legitimacy	   requires	  at	   least	   the	  appearance	  of	   independence	  even	   if	   they	  
are	   in	   continuous	   and	  dependent	   negotiation	   and	   compromise	  with	   regime	  power-­‐holders.	   In	  
the	  UK	  for	  example	  during	  the	  1960s	  Wilson	  Labour	  years	  and	  the	  ‘social	  contract’,	  apparently	  
independent	   trades	   unions	   had	   a	   beer	   and	   sandwiches	   intimacy	   with	   Downing	   Street.	   Union	  
leaders	   were	   in	   highly	   ambivalent	   positions:	   back	   room	   deals	   potentially	   undermining	   their	  
legitimacy	   to	   their	  own	  members,	  while	  needing	   the	  occasional	   strike	  or	  meaningful	   threat	  of	  
one	   in	   order	   to	   demonstrate	   to	   government	   that	   they	   retained	   a	   power	   to	   disrupt.	   These	  
relationships	   indicated	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   corporate	   state.	   But	   we	   have	   earlier	   examples	   of	   the	  
social	   contract	   in	  practice:	   the	  pre-­‐2WW	  fascist	   regimes	   in	   Italy	  and	   later	  Germany	  comprised	  
populist	   parties	   penetrating	   the	   entire	   organisational	   landscape	   of	   the	   society:	   professional	  
bodies;	   youth	   movements;	   workers’	   associations;	   the	   press;	   charities.	   And	   of	   course	   the	  
pressures	  of	   that	  war	   itself	   suspended	  politics	   in	   the	  UK	  as	   key	  aspects	  of	   resource	  allocation	  
were	  traded	  between	  collaborating	  leaders	  of	  the	  respective	  ‘estates’.1	  And	  regimes	  apparently	  
as	   far	   apart	   as	   the	   USSR	   and	   Japan	   both	   pervaded	   the	   putative	   organisations	   of	   civil	   society	  
before,	  during	  and,	  for	  the	  USSR,	  after	  that	  war.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  reference	  to	  ‘estates’	  derives	  from	  the	  medieval	  distinction	  between	  clergy,	  nobility	  and	  the	  
commoners,	  akin	  to	  varna	  categories	  in	  Hinduism.	  This	  context	  of	  3	  estates,	  or	  orders,	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  
idea	  of	  the	  ‘fourth	  estate’.	  Thus	  Edmund	  Burke	  referred	  to	  the	  fourth	  estate	  in	  the	  gallery	  of	  the	  House	  of	  
Commons,	  namely	  the	  Press.	  Thomas	  Carlyle	  also	  deployed	  the	  same	  idea	  in	  his	  History	  of	  the	  French	  
Revolution.	  Today,	  the	  term	  ‘fourth	  estate’	  refers	  to	  societal	  or	  political	  forces	  whose	  influence	  is	  not	  
always	  recognised	  by	  powerholders.	  This	  is	  close	  to	  the	  contemporary	  idea	  of	  civil	  society.	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Indeed	   there	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   persistent	   theme	   that	   periods	   of	   crisis	   collapse	   any	   meaningful	  
distinction	   between	   state	   and	   society,	   as	   external	   ‘others’	   are	   confronted,	   requiring	   unity	   at	  
home.	  Post	  war	  reconstruction	  in	  the	  USSR	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  sustained	  strongly	  that	  ideology	  
of	  unity	  above	  all	  else,	  embodied	  in	  deliberate	  re-­‐workings	  of	  nationalism.	  Communist	  regimes	  
in	  China	  and	   later	  SE	  Asia	  reproduced	  these	  forms	  of	  excessive	  state	  penetration	  over	  society.	  
And	  during	   the	   same	  period,	   authoritarian,	  military-­‐bureaucratic	   regimes	  across	   Latin	  America	  
(O’Donnell	   1986)	   displayed	   strong	   features	   of	   corporatism	   and	   syndicalism,	   perhaps	   most	  
famously	  under	  Peron	  in	  Argentina.	  
Thus	  one	  might	  conclude	  from	  all	  of	  this	  that	  Gramsci	  offered	  the	  more	  accurate	  account	  of	  civil	  
society	  as	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  state,	  performing	  a	  range	  of	  politically	  aggregating	  functions	  under	  
the	  guise	  of	  separation	  while	  being	  thoroughly	  implicated	  in	  the	  state’s	  project.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  
tradition	   of	   de	   Tocqueville	   arises	   from	   a	   more	   specific	   experience	   associated	   with	   the	   more	  
libertarian	   pursuits	   of	   post	   Revolutionary	   France,	   its	   democratic	   lessons	   for	   the	   newly	  
independent	   United	   States	   of	   America,	   and	   the	   history	   of	   hostility	   and	   suspicion	   towards	  
monarchs	   and	   their	   lackeys	   in	   the	   nations	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom.	   And	   yet,	   it	   is	   the	   liberal-­‐
democratic-­‐pluralist	  model	  derived	  from	  these	  rather	  more	  specific	  historical	  experiences,	  which	  
have	  become	  the	  universal	  benchmark	  not	  only	  by	  which	  societies	  are	  judged	  but	  also	  by	  how	  
they	  are	  understood	  and	  analysed.	   In	  other	  words,	   societies	  are	  being	  analysed	   for	  what	   they	  
are	  not	   instead	   for	  what	   they	  are.	   It	  has	  been	  difficult	   to	  disentangle	   the	  normative	   from	   the	  
descriptive	  as	  a	  result,	  which	  is	  why	  Violence	  and	  Social	  Orders	  is	  seen	  by	  us	  as	  so	  important.	  It	  
offers	  some	  prospect	  of	  analytical	  connection	  between	  Gramsci	  and	  de	  Tocqeville	  via	  the	  notion	  
of	  doorstep	  conditions	  between	  limited	  and	  open	  access	  states.	  We	  will	  come	  to	  their	  schema	  
presently.	  
Significance	  of	  the	  Natural	  State	  for	  Civil	  Society	  
Why	  do	  we	  pose	  the	  question	  in	  the	  title	  of	  this	  paper?	  The	  term	  ‘natural	  state’	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  
North	  et	   al	   (2009),	   characterising	   limited	   access	   states	   as	  natural	   states,	   sub-­‐divided	  between	  
fragile,	  basic	  and	  mature.	  We	  think	  it	  is	  rather	  easy	  to	  assign	  Bangladesh	  to	  the	  natural,	  limited	  
access	  category,	  though	  whether	  it	  is	  fragile,	  basic	  or	  mature	  is	  harder	  to	  determine,	  reminding	  
us	  that	  typologies	  are	  heuristic	  and	  not	  necessarily	  to	  be	  applied	  too	  literally,	  though	  North	  et	  al	  
(2009)	   try	   to	   do	   so	   for	   their	   example	   countries.	   A	   key	   premise	   of	   the	   natural	   state	   is	   that	  
organisations	   are	   not	   free	   of	   the	   state,	   whether	   represented	   by	   key	   overbearing	   individual	  
rulers/personalities,	  or	  by	  a	  more	  generalised	  social	  persona	  or	  political	  class—or	  more	  likely	  a	  
mix	  of	  both.	  Not	  to	  be	   free	  of	   the	  state	  seriously	  undermines	  the	   idea	  of	  civil	   society	   in	   its	  de	  
Tocquevillian	   sense,	   removing	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   ‘between	   elections’	   democratic	   functions	  
associated	   with	   accountability	   as	   well	   as	   policy	   refinement.	   It	   is	   our	   contention	   that	   in	  
Bangladesh	  most	  of	  those	  organisations	  to	  which	  can	  be	  applied	  the	  collective	  term	  ‘civil	  society’	  
are	  not	   free	  of	   the	   state.	  However,	   the	  explanations	   for	   the	  actual	   relationships	  between	  civil	  
and	  state	  organisations	  are	  multi-­‐layered	  and	  not	  just	  attributable	  to	  a	  syndicalist	  conspiracy	  by	  
ruling	   control	   freaks.	   Thus	   Bangladesh	   is	   not	   alone.	   The	   structural	   weakness	   of	   civil	   society,	  
evidenced	  by	   its	  unfreedom,	   is	   shared	  with	  other	   societies	  at	   similar	  points	  of	   transition	   from	  
relatively	  recent	  agrarian	  pasts	  with	  complex	  forms	  of	  indigenous	  social	  capital	  and	  institutional	  
practices.	  The	  organisations	  of	  putative	  civil	  society	  do	  not	  grow	  in	  a	  vacuum.	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By	  posing	  the	  question	  in	  this	  way	  with	  an	  expectation	  of	  a	  complex	  answer,	  we	  are	  placing	  the	  
aspirations	   for	   civil	   society	   in	   Bangladesh	   within	   a	   context	   of	   governance,	   rights	   and	  
representation—in	  other	  words	  a	  normative	  agenda	  of	  citizenship.	  Although	  we	  have	  used	  the	  
prison	   metaphor	   previously	   (Wood	   2000)	   to	   describe	   the	   entrapment	   of	   most	   people	   in	  
Bangladesh	  within	  systems	  of	  non-­‐transparent,	  personalised	  transactions,	  there	  is	  nevertheless	  
an	  active	  debate	  and	  deliberate	  activity	  by	  escapees	  and	  their	  international	  sponsors	  (i.e.	  the	  aid	  
community)	  to	  advance	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  meaningful	  civil	  society	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  forms.	  So	  we	  are	  
not	  observing	  an	  hegemonic,	  unchallenged	  suppression	  of	  rights,	  but	  rather	  a	  struggle	  albeit	  a	  
rather	   uneven	   one.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   central	   question	   is	   worth	   asking.	   There	   is	   a	   dynamic	  
interactive	  process,	  a	  dialectic,	  of	  incorporation	  as	  well	  as	  attempts	  to	  break	  free,	  indicating	  not	  
a	  fixed,	  locked	  in	  system	  but	  an	  ongoing	  contestation.	  
We	  certainly	  agree	  with	  North	  et	  al	  (2009)	  that	  the	  freedom	  of	  non-­‐state	  organisations	  from	  the	  
state	  is	  a	  key	  doorstep	  condition	  for	  an	  open	  access	  society.	  However,	  our	  argument	  cannot	  be	  a	  
simple	   mechanistic	   one.	   	   The	   apparently	   straightforward	   idea	   of	   a	   ‘freedom	   indicator’2	  
oversimplifies	   the	   relative	   autonomy	   of	   the	   estates	   in	   any	   society.	   The	   ‘freedom’	   formulation	  
artificially	   disentangles	   formal	   roles	   from	  more	   complex	   underlying	   interests,	  motivations	   and	  
relationships.	  An	   anthropologist	  would	   refer	   to	   these	   as	   crosscutting	   ties,	  meaning	   that	   social	  
players	  in	  apparently	  separate	  organisations	  with	  formally	  separate,	  contesting	  missions	  are	  also	  
bound	  together	  by	  family	  and	  class	  identities	  in	  other	  equally	  important	  associations.	  As	  a	  result,	  
behaviour	   in	   both	   domains	   is	   moderated.	   Indeed	   some	   agendas	   never	   surface,	   as	   they	   are	  
informally	   pre-­‐negotiated	   off	   the	   table,	   akin	   to	   Lukes’s	   second	   dimension	   of	   power	   (1974).	  
Another	   way	   to	   capture	   this	   is	   to	   follow	   North’s	   earlier	   distinction	   between	   institution	   and	  
organisation	  (1990)	  and	  repeated	  in	  Violence	  and	  Social	  Orders	  (2009,	  p15).	  Thus	  institutions	  are	  
‘rules	   of	   the	   game’	   (1990)	   and	   the	   ‘patterns	   of	   interaction	   that	   govern	   and	   constrain	   the	  
relationships	   of	   individuals’.	   ‘Institutions	   include	   formal	   rules,	   written	   laws,	   formal	   social	  
conventions,	  informal	  norms	  of	  behaviour,	  and	  shared	  beliefs	  about	  the	  world…’.	  Organisations	  
are	   more	   purposive	   counterparts	   of	   institutions,	   comprising	   specific	   groups	   of	   individuals	  
deliberately	  associating	  with	  each	  other	  to	  pursue	  common	  as	  well	  as	  individual	  goals.	  There	  is	  
some	  parallel	  to	  the	  Tonnies	  distinction	  between	  gemeinschaft	  and	  gesellschaft,3	  except	  that	  we	  
do	  not	  want	  to	  over-­‐emphasise	  the	  contrast	  between	  small	  scale	  and	   large	  scale	  embedded	  in	  
the	  Tonnies	  contrast.	  Perhaps	  there	  is	  also	  a	  ‘base’	  ‘superstructure’	  parallel	  from	  Marx,	  though	  
he	  was	  more	   intent	  on	  capturing	  a	  causal	  relationship	  between	  underlying	  economic	  structure	  
or	  infrastructure	  (i.e.	  base)	  and	  its	  management	  and	  representation	  through	  politics	  and	  culture.	  
The	  Concept	  of	  Permeability	  
Let	   us	   return	   to	   crosscutting	   ties	   and	   Bangladesh.	   In	   previous	  writing	   (Wood	   2000	   and	   2011,	  
Landell-­‐Mills	   2002))	   governance	   issues	   in	   Bangladesh	   have	   been	   analysed	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘deep	  
structures’	   and	   institutional	   responsibility	   domains.	   In	   particular	   we	   have	   pursued	   the	  
proposition	  that	  the	  formal	  domains	  of	  state,	  market,	  community	  (read:	  organised	  civil	  society	  
and	   inherent	   social	   institutions)	   and	   household	   are	   permeable,	   rather	   than	   representing	  
separate	   rules	   of	   the	   game.	   This	   permeability	   proposition	   is	   absolutely	   central	   to	   our	   overall	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  example,	  as	  favoured	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  ‘social	  development	  indicators’	  exercise.	  
3	  Always	  difficult	  to	  translate	  into	  English,	  though	  ‘community’	  and	  ‘association’	  are	  usually	  used.	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argument.	   The	   liberal	   bourgeois	   myth	   of	   separated	   domains	   enabling	   the	   compensation	   and	  
regulation	  of	  behaviour	  between	  them	  is	  fundamentally	  undermined	  when	  permeability	  exists.	  
This	   is	   the	   conceptual	   challenge	   of	   the	   Ummah	   (Wood	   2009).	   Under	   conditions	   such	   as	   for	  
Bangladesh,	  this	  permeability	  is	  treated	  from	  the	  De	  Tocqueville	  perspective	  as	  negative	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  mutual	  contamination	  between	  domains	   thus	  denying	  a	   rights-­‐based	  existence	   for	  all	  
the	  population.	  It	  is	  this	  proposition,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  ‘prison’	  analogy.	  The	  proposition	  has	  direct	  
significance	   for	   understanding	   welfare	   regimes	   and	   the	   limitations	   of	   the	   Polanyian	  
compensation	  schema.4	  
Apparent	  and	  Hidden	  Behaviour	  
By	   deploying	   a	   distinction	   between	   institutions	   and	   organisations,	   and	   the	   language	   of	   deep	  
structures	  and	  cross	  cutting	  ties,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  a	  contrast	  between	  apparent	  and	  
hidden	  behaviour.5	  Apparent	  behaviour	  occurs	  more	  completely	   in	   the	  organisational	  domain.	  
Socially	  constructed	  actors	  interact	  with	  each	  other	  through	  their	  formally	  acknowledged	  roles.	  
In	   this	   sense	   they	  are	  definitely	   ‘acting’.	   It	   is	  a	  structured	  drama	  characterised	  by	   role	  specific	  
language	  and	  costume.	  Indeed	  it	  is	  a	  world	  of	  cases	  rather	  than	  stories.6	  Hidden	  behaviour	  refers	  
to	  the	  institutional	  domain	  where	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  apply.	  This	  is	  a	  world	  of	  diffuse7,	  
multiplex	   ties	   being	   activated	   simultaneously	   –	   a	   world	   of	   favours	   and	   obligations	   entailing	  
multi-­‐period	  games.	  This	   is	  an	  oral	  underworld,	   relying	  upon	  memory	  and	  triangulation.	   It	   is	  a	  
world,	   which	   demands	   the	   tacit	   understanding	   of	   its	   players	   and	   a	   sense	   of	   continuous	  
membership	   to	   manage	   compliance	   and	   indeed	   complicity.	   Failing	   to	   honour	   expected	  
obligations	   is	   risky	   and	   incurs	   sanctions	   and/or	   ostracism.	   Exits	   are	   hard	   to	   find.	   It	   is	   all	  
embracing.	  Hidden	  behaviour	  is	  the	  real	  purpose	  of	  apparent	  behaviour.	  
It	   is	   important,	   at	   this	   point,	   to	   remind	  ourselves	   that	   the	   lived	   combination	  of	   apparent	   and	  
hidden	   behaviour	   is	   a	   universal	   social	   phenomenon.	   It	   is	   the	   essential	   epistemology	   of	   good	  
sociology.	  And,	  in	  that	  sense,	  the	  distinction	  is	  neither	  new	  nor	  in	  itself	  particularly	  interesting.	  
Rather	  it	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  domains	  in	  different	  limited	  and	  open	  access	  state	  
conditions,	  which	  matters.	  Thus	  we	  might	  say	  that	  in	  open	  access	  societies	  the	  hidden	  realms	  of	  
our	  behaviour	  are	  more	  suppressed,	  or	  even	  repressed.	  This	  suppression	  may	  be	  reinforced	  by	  
the	  lower	  interconnected	  density	  of	  primordial	  relationships,	  so	  that	  actors	  are	  freer	  to	  act	  their	  
formal	  roles	  with	  more	  anonymity	  and	  be	  primarily	  identified	  with	  them.	  In	  other	  words	  there	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  state	  protection	  of	  labour	  rights	  in	  otherwise	  open	  markets	  (Polanyi	  1944).	  See	  
also	  Esping-­‐Andersen	  (1990	  and	  1999),	  as	  well	  as	  Wood	  and	  Gough	  (2006)	  for	  the	  use	  of	  ‘de-­‐
commodification’,	  derived	  from	  the	  same	  separation/compensation	  principle.	  
5	  Another	  way	  of	  understanding	  this	  artificial	  layer	  of	  interaction	  is	  to	  recall	  Goffman’s	  Presentation	  of	  Self	  
in	  Everyday	  Life	  (1971)—we	  interact	  through	  constructed	  ‘fronts’	  (formal	  organisations),	  taking	  care	  to	  
disguise	  our	  ‘backs’	  (deep	  structures	  or	  institutions).	  It	  is	  thus	  by	  reference	  to	  this	  ‘game’	  that	  the	  
contradiction	  exists.	  And	  there	  is	  widespread	  collusion	  in	  this	  game.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  we	  have	  ‘pretend’	  societies,	  
seeking	  normatively	  to	  act	  out	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  liberal	  democratic	  pluralist	  state	  for	  an	  audience,	  while	  
behaving	  pragmatically	  by	  another	  much	  more	  acceptable	  and	  culturally	  familiar	  set	  of	  rules	  derived	  from	  
the	  intimate	  personalised	  structures	  of	  agrarian	  relations:	  patron-­‐clientelism	  enriched	  by	  kinship,	  clan	  and	  
regional	  identities,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘batch’.	  
6	  See	  Wood	  1985	  and	  2007	  on	  labelling	  which	  asserts	  that	  stories	  are	  the	  real	  ‘us’,	  while	  cases	  are	  the	  
abstracted	  elements	  of	  our	  story	  specific	  to	  compartmentalised	  transactions	  to	  get	  formal	  business	  done.	  
7	  The	  contrast	  between	  specific	  and	  diffuse	  is	  derived	  from	  Talcott	  Parsons’	  ‘pattern	  variables’,	  in	  this	  
instance	  a	  reference	  to	  role	  performance.	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less	  permeability.	  The	  domains	  of	  apparent	  and	  hidden	  are	  kept	  more	  easily	  apart.	  And	  because	  
they	  are	  so,	  any	  permeable	  transgression	  is	  widely	  perceived	  as	  inappropriately	  self-­‐serving	  and	  
corrupt.	  Case	  law	  is	  paramount,	  the	  room	  for	  discretion	  tiny.	  But	  in	  limited	  access	  societies,	  the	  
hidden	   behaviour	   bubbles	  more	   obviously	   to	   the	   surface,	   having	   a	   strong	   influence	   upon	   the	  
acting	  out	  of	  formal,	  apparent	  roles.	  The	  expectations	  arising	  from	  the	  informal	  or	  ‘natural’	  rules	  
of	  the	  game	  gain	  currency	  in	  the	  formal	  drama.	  The	  space	  between	  front	  and	  back	  collapses.	  Yet	  
the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  respectable	  veneer	  remains	  an	   important	  device	   in	  the	  capture	  of	  rents,	  
providing	   a	   thin	   layer	   of	   legitimacy	   to	   essentially	   personal	  motives.	   The	   transactions	   between	  
the	  hidden	  and	  apparent	  domains	  have	  other	  dimensions	  also.	  The	  competition	  for	  the	  formal	  
roles	  can	  be	   intense	  precisely	  due	  to	  the	  veneer	  of	   legitimacy	  for	  private	  rent	  seeking	  and	  the	  
consequent	   distribution	   of	   these	   rents	   among	   kin	   and	   friends.	   But	   prices	   have	   to	   be	   paid	   to	  
reach	  the	  ‘audition’	  and	  subsequently	  win	  the	  formal	  role.	  Those	  prices	  are	  paid	   in	  the	  hidden	  
domain	  with	  an	  expectation	  of	  payback.	  	  	  	  
‘Natural,	  limited	  access	  states’	  applied	  to	  Bangladesh	  
Before	  considering	  the	  case	  of	  Bangladesh	  more	  specifically,	  the	  core	  argument	  in	  Violence	  and	  
Social	   Orders	   should	   be	   outlined	   since	   it	   offers	   a	   highly	   recognisable	   framework	   for	   a	   deep	  
structures	  approach	  to	  governance.	  For	  them:	  
‘The	   progression	   of	   natural	   states	   involves	   increasing	   more	   complex	   societies,	  
requiring	   increasingly	   complex	   institutions	   that	   support	  more	   complex	  organisations.	  
In	   all	   natural	   states,	   economics	   is	   politics	   by	   other	   means:	   economic	   and	   political	  
systems	  are	  closely	  enmeshed,	  along	  with	  religious,	  military	  and	  educational	  systems.’	  
(p72)	  
This	   is	   their	   core	   epistemology	   reflecting	   their	   overall	   perspective.	   It	   has	   resonance	   with	   my	  
arguments	  about	  permeability	  between	  the	  domain	  elements	  of	  the	  ‘institutional	  responsibility’	  
square	   (state,	  market,	   community	  and	  household).	  Adapting	  my	  previous	  arguments	   to	   theirs,	  
negative	   permeability	   (the	   dysfunctional	   blurring	   of	   institutional	   boundaries)	   is	   most	   strong	  
under	  fragile	  natural	  state	  conditions,	  but	  also	  significant	  in	  any	  movement	  from	  basic	  to	  mature	  
natural	   states.	   In	   this	  progression,	   although	  organisations	  become	  more	   codified,	   ‘the	  process	  
initially	  occurs	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sector;	  indeed	  it	  is	  a	  primary	  reason	  that	  
governments	   in	  most	   limited	   access	   societies	   appear	   so	   corrupt	   to	  observers	   from	   from	  open	  
access	   societies’	   (p73).	   This	   is	   particularly	   a	   function	   of	   the	   personal	   identity	   of	   elites:	  
‘organisations	   in	   fragile	   natural	   states	   are	   usually	   tied	   to	   powerful	   individuals’	   (p	   73).	   But	   ‘as	  
societies	   move	   towards	   basic	   natural	   states,	   these	   identities	   become	   less	   associated	   with	  
specific	   individuals	   and	   more	   with	   social	   personas	   that	   become	   associated	   with	   powerful	  
organisations’	  (my	  emphasis,	  p73).	  	  Thus	  my	  earlier	  permeability	  argument8	  is	  supported	  by	  their	  
statement	  that:	  ‘Most	  important	  basic	  natural	  state	  organisations	  are	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  
(private)	  (sic)	   individual	   identities	  of	  the	  elites	  who	  inhabit	  them.	  These	  organisations	  span	  the	  
boundary	  of	  public	  and	  private,	  personal	  and	  social.’	  (p73)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  From	  Prisoners	  and	  Escapees,	  (Wood	  2000)	  but	  also	  a	  term	  used	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  by	  Oliver	  de	  Sardan	  
(2008)	  writing	  about	  Africa.	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Applying	   this	   insight	   to	   Bangladesh	   helps	   to	   establish	   the	   transitional	   phenomena	   which	   is	  
familiar	  to	  observers,	  namely	  the	  melange	  of:	  powerful	  individuals;	  the	  activities	  of	  an	  exclusive	  
political	  class	  (social	  persona);	  and	  the	  intimate	  connections	  between	  this	  class	  and	  elite	  strata	  
in	  other,	  private	  and	  non-­‐government	  sectors.	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	   talked	  of	   ‘circulating	  elites’,	  and	  
with	  anti-­‐incumbent	  voting	   in	   the	   ‘winner	   takes	  all’	  politics	  of	  Bangladesh,	   there	   is	  a	   revolving	  
door	  between	  public	  and	  private	  roles.	  Ethnographically,	  this	  circulation	  occurs	  among	  members	  
of	  large,	  sprawling	  kinship	  groups	  who	  at	  any	  point	  in	  time	  straddle	  the	  public	  and	  private,	  even	  
if	   the	   actual	   personages	   rotate	   between	   the	   domains.	   Such	   kin,	   even	   several	   times	   removed,	  
recognise	   a	   loose	   structure	   of	  mutual	   obligations	   and	   favours	   between	   each	   other,	   played	   as	  
repeated,	  multi-­‐period	  games.	  Such	  underpinning	  keeps	  the	  political	  class	  intact,	  even	  when	  the	  
more	   extreme	   ‘tribal’	   identities	   are	   seeking	   to	   de-­‐legitimise	   the	  history	   and	  political	   claims	  of	  
each	  other	   in	  absolutist	   terms.	  While	   such	  crosscutting	   ties	  might	  be	  a	   sign	  of	  maturity,	   there	  
are,	  however,	  no	  guarantees	  of	  progression.	  Thus:	  
‘No	   teleology	  pushes	   states	   through	   the	  progression	   from	   fragile	   to	   basic	   to	  mature	  
states.	   The	   dynamics	   of	   natural	   states	   are	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   dominant	   coalition,	  
frequently	   renegotiating	   and	   shifting	   in	   response	   to	   changing	   conditions.	   If	  
adjustments	   lead	   to	   more	   power	   and	   rents	   based	   on	   personal	   identity,	   institutions	  
become	   simpler	   and	   organisations	   less	   sophisticated,	   and	   the	   society	   moves	   to	   the	  
fragile	   end	   of	   the	   progression	   of	   natural	   states.	   If	   adjustments	   lead	   to	  more	   power	  
based	   on	   durable	   agreements,	   institutions	   become	  more	   complex	   and	   organisations	  
more	  sophisticated,	  and	  societies	  more	  toward	  the	  mature	  end	  of	  the	  progression.	  No	  
compelling	  logic	  moves	  states	  in	  either	  direction.’	  (p73)	  
This	   quotation	   contains	   several	   issues	   for	   us	   involving	   the	   tension	   between	   personality	   and	  
structure.	  The	  progression	  towards	  mature	  natural	  states	  with	  limited	  access	  is	  partly	  a	  problem	  
of	   ‘constraining	  personality’	   (p74)	  and	  partly	   the	  causally	   related	   issue	  of	  bringing	  about	  more	  
specialist	  organisations	  which	  are	  both	   independent	  of	   the	  whim	  of	  the	  ruler	  while	  organically	  
interdependent.9	  In	  other	  words,	  are	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  coalitions	  of	  elites,	  the	  political	  class,	  to	  
be	  achieved	  through	  the	  patronage	  of	  rulers	  as	  in	  fragile	  or	  even	  basic	  natural	  states	  or	  through	  
a	  codified	  allocation	  of	  rents	  and	  privileges	  which	  are	  sufficiently	  inclusive	  of	  those	  voted	  out	  of	  
office	  as	  to	  avoid	  disorder,	  coups	  and	  civil	  wars.10	  And	  given	  that	  we	  are	  observing	  an	  extended	  
patronage	  system	  down	  to	  grassroots,	  micro	  level	  access,	  the	  issue	  of	  personal	  identity	  politics	  is	  
a	  reference	  to	  a	  system	  not	  just	  to	  leaders	  at	  the	  top.	  And	  if	  we	  face	  the	  presence	  of	  personality	  
from	  top	  to	  bottom	  of	  this	  system,	  then	  the	  issue	  of	  succession	  has	  to	  be	  resolved	  at	  all	   levels	  
too	  before	  a	  natural	  state	  even	  reaches	  the	  ‘basic’	  mode.	  
While	  North	  et	  al	  (2009)	  are	  substantially	  aiding	  the	  analysis	  of	  Bangladesh	  with	  this	  framework,	  
there	  appears	   to	  be	  a	   further	  complication	  not	   really	  considered	  by	   them.	  Not	  all	   institutional	  
rules	  and	  organisational	   forms	  can	  be	  classified	   in	  one	  single	   type	   (i.e.	   fragile,	  basic	  or	  mature	  
natural,	  limited	  access	  states—let	  alone	  open	  access	  ones)	  as	  they	  do	  not	  move	  perfectly	  in	  step	  
with	  each	  other	  for	  an	  ex-­‐colonial	  society	  like	  Bangladesh.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  Alavi	  thesis	  (1972)	  
also	  assists	  our	   thinking.	  The	  colonial	  process	  of	  establishing	  specialist	  organisations,	   relatively	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Organically	  interdependent,	  in	  a	  Durkheimian	  sense.	  This	  point	  is	  very	  akin	  to	  the	  structural-­‐functionalist	  
tradition	  in	  anthropology	  and	  political	  science.	  
10	  See	  Mushtaq	  Khan’s	  paper	  for	  the	  World	  Bank	  (2010)	  which	  deploys	  an	  earlier	  essay	  of	  North	  on	  
Limited	  Access	  Order	  (LAO)	  to	  periodise	  phases	  of	  rent	  seeking	  by	  political	  classes	  in	  the	  Bangladesh	  State.	  
Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  Bangladesh	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independent	   of	   any	   ruling	   coalition	   of	   elites,	   such	   as	   the	   legal	   system,	   educational	   entities,	  
taxation	   and	   revenue	   authorities	   and	   so	   on,	   sets	   up	   an	   overdeveloped	   bureaucracy,	  with	   the	  
appearance	   of	   Weberian	   principles,	   while	   democratic	   politics11	   is	   left	   trailing	   as	   competing	  
propertied	   classes	   (agrarian,	   commercial	   urban	   comprador,	   and	   metropolitan)	   vie	   with	   each	  
other	  for	  sectoral	  advantage	  while	  also	  seeking	  their	  collective	  interest	  in	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  
principle	   of	   rents	   and	   privileges.	   Thus	   the	   veneer	   of	   formal	   sophistication	   may	   lie	   in	   some	  
institutional	   arenas	   (i.e.	   Public	   Service	   Commission	   or	   the	   Establishments	   Division)	   due	   to	  
colonial	  inheritance,	  while	  the	  rules	  of	  political	  competition	  remain	  crude,	  immature	  and	  highly	  
fragile.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  co-­‐existence	  of	  form.	  	  
Social	  origins	  of	  present	  deep	  structures	  
From	  the	  inception	  of	  liberated	  Bangladesh,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  continuity	  of	  problematic	  practices	  
and	  behaviour	  within	  government	  among	  politicians	  and	  public	  officials	  and	  between	  them	  and	  
the	  rest	  of	  the	  society,	  without	  effective	  regulation	  in	  governance	  terms	  either	  from	  apparatuses	  
of	  government	  or	  from	  the	  civil	  society.	  These	  practices	  have	  been	  analysed	  by	  various	  writers	  
over	   the	   last	   decade	   especially,	   including	   myself	   (Prisoners	   and	   Escapees12)	   and	   Landell-­‐Mills	  
(Taming	   the	   Leviathan13).	   More	   recently	   BRAC’s	   Institute	   of	   Governance	   Studies	   (IGS)	   has	  
provided	  similar	  and	  in-­‐depth	  analysis	  in	  a	  sequence	  of	  State	  of	  Governance	  Reports	  (SOG	  06,	  07	  
and	   08).	   Aspects	   of	   these	   reports	   have	   been	   informed	   by	   the	   research	   of	   Transparency	  
International	   Bangladesh	   (TIB).	   The	   IGS	   analysis	   offers	   a	   deeper	   reflection	   on	   causes	   of	   poor	  
practice,	  than	  the	  more	  factual,	  descriptive	  information	  from	  TIB	  and	  elsewhere.	  SOG	  08	  actually	  
appeared	   in	   09	   and	   thus	   embraces	   behaviour	   of	   the	   present	   government	   actors	   as	   well	   as	  
previous	  ones.	  
South	  Asian,	  ex-­‐British	  and	  recently	  agrarian	  societies,	  are	  characterised	  by	  severe	  socio-­‐cultural	  
as	  well	   as	   economic	   inequalities.	   There	   is	   considerable	   deference	   to	   those	   above	   you	   on	   the	  
social	   scale,	   however	   expressed—caste,	  bangsho	   14and	   so	   on.	  Within	   this	   elite-­‐mass,	   agrarian	  
inheritance,	   most	   people	   thus	   have	   a	   deep	   rooted	   fatalism	   and	   de	   facto	   tolerance	   of	   non-­‐
transparent,	   non-­‐accountable,	   undemocratic	   practices.	   They	   have	   expected	   their	   leaders	   to	  
behave	  as	  zamindars15	  with	  unchallenged	  authority.	  These	  feudal	  legacies	  have	  now	  evolved	  via	  
the	   arrival	   of	   political	   parties	   into	   a	   ‘mastaanisation’16	   of	   the	   countryside	   and	   the	   society	   at	  
large,	  an	  extension	  of	  urban	  mafia	  like	  institutions,	  indicative	  of	  rapidly	  evolving	  opportunities,17	  
mediating	  between	  people’s	  immediate	  needs	  and	  imperfect	  markets	  and	  states	  in	  which	  these	  
needy	   ‘clients’	   have	   no	   power	   or	   influence.	   The	   tolerance	   of	   these	   institutionalised	   practices	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Including,	  critically,	  civil	  society.	  
12	  Public	  Administration	  and	  Development	  2000	  
13	  A	  World	  Bank	  report	  (2002)	  from	  a	  review	  of	  Public	  Institutional	  Performance	  in	  Bangladesh	  in	  1999.	  	  
14	  Bangsho:	  lineage,	  which	  are	  understood	  hierarchically	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  social	  status	  
15	  Zamindars:	  	  the	  old	  landlord	  class,	  used	  to	  describe	  anyone	  (men)	  behaving	  like	  traditional	  patrons	  
16	  The	  term	  ‘mastaan’	  refers	  to	  an	  underworld	  of	  gangsters	  and	  brokers,	  perhaps	  akin	  to	  the	  mafia.	  They	  
are	  normally	  associated	  with	  criminality,	  but	  recent	  work	  has	  recognised	  their	  role	  as	  intermediaries	  (e.g.	  
between	  slums	  and	  municipalities)	  for	  their	  clients,	  enabling	  informal	  routes	  of	  access	  to	  services,	  
employment	  opportunities	  and	  protection.	  Thus	  they	  represent	  a	  kind	  of	  social	  capital,	  though	  not	  quite	  
as	  intended	  by	  Putnam.	  See	  Khan	  (2000)	  for	  a	  detailed	  exposition	  of	  this	  argument	  in	  a	  Dhaka	  slum.	  
17	  The	  economy	  is,	  after	  all,	  growing	  through	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  garments	  industry	  and	  other	  globalised	  
economy	  activity,	  providing	  an	  expanded	  base	  for	  rent	  seeking.	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thus	   reflects	   socio-­‐cultural	   history,	   but	   now	   reinforced	   by	   more	   superficial	   threats	   and	  
inducements.	  
Although	   the	   liberation	   narrative	   for	   Bangladesh	   juxtaposed	   an	   incipient	   nation	   of	   small	  
peasants	   against	   the	   landlord	   and	   bureaucratic-­‐military	   elites	   of	   the	   Punjab,	   the	   East	   Bengal	  
delta	  was	  more	  complex	  in	  its	  agrarian	  structure	  (Wood	  1981)	  and	  by	  no	  means	  as	  homogenous	  
as	  the	  narrative	  implied.	  Of	  course	  that	  narrative	  was	  politically	  heuristic	  and	  thus	  a	  deliberate	  
construction	  within	  a	  fission	  and	  fusion	  framework	  of	  political	  identity.	  The	  reality	  was	  that	  while	  
there	   were	   key	   pockets	   of	   minifundist,	   small	   peasant	   farming	   as	   in	   the	   Dhaka-­‐Comilla	   belt,	  
elsewhere	  there	  were	  more	  significant	  landlords,	  sharecropping	  tenants	  and	  effectively	  landless	  
labour.	   And	   even	   within	   the	   minifundist	   region,	   the	   archetype	   of	   Awami	   League	   mythology,	  
there	   were	   key	   indicators	   of	   inequality,	   dependency	   and	   patron-­‐clientelism	   (Huq	   ed	   1976	  
Exploitation	   and	   the	   Rural	   Poor).	   And	   of	   course,	   East	   Bengal/Pakistan	   in	   1971	  was	   very	   rural,	  
unusually	   so	   even	   for	   South	   Asia.	   There	  was	   a	   tiny	   urban	   elite,	  mainly	   in	   Dhaka	  with	   landed	  
property	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   bureaucratic,	   education,	   trading	   and	   manufacturing	   roles—an	  
essentially	   comprador	  elite	   incorporated	   into	   the	  East	   Indian	  Company	  and	  British	   colonialism	  
(see	   State	   of	   Dhaka	   City	   Report	   2011,	   IGS	   forthcoming).	   This	   admittedly	   over-­‐simplified	  
characterisation	   reveals	   to	   us	   that	   only	   a	   single	   generation	   ago,	   Bangladesh	  was	   agrarian	   and	  
pre-­‐capitalist	  in	  its	  mode	  of	  production	  and	  exchange.	  Power	  was	  exercised	  essentially	  through	  
family	   and	   patron-­‐client	   forms	   of	   exchange	   through	   concentric	   circles	   of	  moral	   proximity	   and	  
intimacy,	  and	  through	  diffused,	  multi-­‐dimensional,	  multi-­‐period	  games.	  Clearly	  much	  theory	  and	  
empirical	  observation	  is	  collapsed	  and	  condensed	  into	  this	  summary	  account	  of	  power.	  But	  this	  
conceptual	  formulation	  of	  agrarian	  forms	  of	  power	  in	  the	  Bangladesh	  can	  be	  traced	  through	  to	  
contemporary	   socio-­‐economic	   structures—what	   I	   have	   previously	   referred	   to	   as	   ‘deep	  
structures’.	  
The	  surreal	  context	  for	  civil	  society	  
This	  context	  provides	  us	  with	  a	  key	  contradiction	  for	  Bangladesh,	  and	  for	  other	  societies	  like	  it	  in	  
South	   Asia	   and	   beyond:	   namely	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   institutions	  which	   effectively	   shape	   the	  
society	   and	   the	   formal	   organisations	   which	   apparently	   populate	   the	   landscape.	   Thus,	   for	  
example,	  a	  political	  party	  may	  exist	  as	  a	   formal	  organisation	  competing	   in	  elections,	  providing	  
governments	  and	  the	  occupation	  of	  the	  Jatiya	  Sangsad,	  but	  its	  institutional	  profile	  resembles	  a	  
traditional	   dal	   comprising	   leaders	   and	   followers	   bound	   together	   by	   highly	   personalised,	  
multiplex	   tiers	   of	   obligation,	   favour	   and	   dependence	   as	   well	   as	   interdependence.	   This	  
contradiction,	  sometimes	  understood	  as	  the	  gap	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  reality,	  is	  well	  known	  in	  
Bangladesh	  among	  its	  political	  actors	  and	  among	  its	  governance	  oriented	  donors.	  It	  provides	  the	  
setting	   for	   a	   complex	   charade	  of	   smoke,	  mirrors	   and	   shadows.	   Thus	   the	  political	   class	   among	  
Bangladeshis	  and	  donors	  in	  Bangladesh	  live	  in	  a	  dual	  world	  of	  implicit	  institutional	  practices	  and	  
explicit	  organisational	  pretension.	  It	   is	   interesting	  that	  the	  donors	  collude	  in	  this	  duality,	  based	  
either	  upon	  naivety	  or	  upon	  the	  false	   idea	  that	  organisational	  reform	  might	  change	  underlying	  
institutional	  principles—a	  kind	  of	  reverse	  causation.	  
So	   we	   might	   expect	   political	   parties	   to	   be	   unable	   to	   separate	   themselves	   from	   prevailing	  
institutional	  cultures	  since	  they	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  securing	  and	  exercising	  power	  by	  whatever	  
means,	  even	  including	  violence	  as	  long	  as	  it	  is	  deniable.	  But	  let	  us	  consider	  a	  stronger	  test	  of	  a	  
Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  Bangladesh	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‘reality/rhetoric	  gap’	  proposition—the	  formally	  created	  non	  governmental	  organisations,	  which	  
potentially	  indicate	  a	  transition	  to	  open	  access	  society.	  They	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  breaking	  away	  
from	  business	  as	  usual.	  Their	  existence	  is	  supposed	  to	  be,	  in	  itself,	  a	  critique	  of	  non-­‐transparent,	  
hidden	   forms	   of	   informal,	   personalised	   forms	   of	   power.	   They	   are	   purposive,	   deliberate	  
associations—a	   standard	   bearer	   for	   gesellschaft	   over	   gemeinschaft.	   They	   are	   supposed	   to	  
represent	   ‘escape’.	   But	   for	   them	   too	   institutional	   norms	   overcome	   organisational	   objectives.	  
Leaderships	  are	  highly	  personalised,	  recruitment	  takes	  loyalty	  strongly	  into	  consideration,	  policy	  
is	   centrally	   directed	   despite	   the	   existence	   of	   formal	   committees,	   and	   there	   is	   exaggerated	  
respect	  and	  deference	  to	  key,	  founder	  directors	  (i.e.	  specific	  individuals	  not	  just	  social	  persona).	  
In	   moments	   of	   dispute	   over	   succession,	   there	   is	   even	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   violence	   and	   the	  
bribing	  of	  third	  party	  officials.	  None	  of	  this	  should	  surprise	  us.	  Prevailing	  societal	  institutions	  set	  
the	   tone	   for	   organisational	   cultures	   so	   that	   associations	   apparently	   created	   for	   deliberate	  
missions	   quickly	   resemble	   patron-­‐client	   communities	   like	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   society.	   The	   internal	  
organisation	  of	  the	  major	  business	  houses	  is	  similar	  (see	  Fukuyama’s	  ‘Trust’	  and	  the	  analysis	  of	  
the	   chaebol	   ,	   1995).	   Thus	   even	   the	  NGO	   ‘test’	   indicates	   basic	   or	   even	   possibly	   fragile	   natural	  
state	  conditions.	  
The	  interesting	  conclusion	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  institutional	  influence	  over	  the	  organisational,	  but	  
that	   this	   further	   layer	   of	   interaction	   exists:	   i.e.	   dealing	  with	   organisations	  as	   if	   they	  were	   not	  
influenced	  by	   their	   institutional	   settings.	  Thus	  political	  parties	  are	   treated	  as	   real	   things	  which	  
can	  be	  improved	  towards	  democracy	  once	  informed	  about	  it,	  as	  if	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  ideal	  
type	   political	   party	   functioning	   was	   the	   problem.	   And	   NGOs	   can	   be	   supported	   as	   if	   they	   are	  
mission	   based,	   objectives	   oriented,	   rationally	   constructed	   organisations	   rather	   than	  
communities	  of	  personally	  attached	  individuals.	  And	  the	  ‘game’	  is	  not	  only	  played	  by	  donors	  but	  
internally	  too,	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  sham	  or	  veneer.	  	  
The	  Demand	  Side	  role	  of	  Civil	  Society	  
From	   this	   ‘institutions	   and	   deep	   structures’	   perspective,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   any	   escape	   route	   to	  
engineer	  some	  kind	  of	  transformation	  from	  a	  limited	  access	  state	  to	  an	  open	  access	  one,	  and	  at	  
the	   same	   time	   hold	   the	   design	   and	   delivery	   of	   essential	   rights,	   entitlements	   and	   services	   to	  
account	  requires	  a	  demand	  side	  stance	  through	  social	  mobilisation	  and	  advocacy	  However,	  the	  
key	  issue	  for	  a	  demand	  side	  driver	  for	  good	  	  governance	  is	  risk	  and	  its	  corollary:	  the	  security	  of	  
agency.	  While	  there	  are	  different	  kinds	  of	  risk,	   the	  main	  focus	  here	   is	  upon	  the	  distribution	  of	  
risk	   between	   political	   actors	   from	  within	   and	   outside	   the	   state:	   i.e.	   from	   those	   benefiting	   in	  
some	  way	  from	  limited	  access	  conditions	  and	  those,	  hitherto	  politically	  excluded	  classes,	  seeking	  
to	  open	  up	  access.	  There	  is	  a	  complex	  principal-­‐agent	  problem	  to	  unravel.	  The	  ‘principal’	  is	  this	  
discussion	   are	   either	   actual	   local	   escapees	   (I	   ignore	   donors	   as	   ultimately	   insignificant	   in	   this	  
discourse)	  or	  a	  more	  diffuse	  or	   latent	   sentiment	   that	   state	  performance	  should	  be	  better	  and	  
characterised	  by	  open	  access	  conditions	  if	  only	  the	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  could	  be	  overcome.	  Thus	  
there	  is	  a	  mass	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  dimension	  to	  extending	  the	  escape	  party!	  
And	  then	  there	  are	  the	  agents:	  organisations	  and	  individuals.	  There	  have	  been	  some	  spectacular	  
failures	  of	  organisational	  agents	   in	  recent	  years	  (e.g.	  our	  anonymised	  case	  of	  PMUS18)	  because	  
they	  have	  either	  crossed	  a	  boundary	  into	  politics	  and/or	  because	  leaders	  have	  been	  financially	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  I	  hope	  to	  add	  a	  further	  case	  of	  Shammo	  in	  a	  leter	  version	  of	  this	  paper.	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corrupt	   (including	   the	   inappropriate	   diversion	   of	   donor	   funds	   into	   direct	   political	  mobilisation	  
and	   electoral	   ambitions).	   The	   boundary	   between	   social	   mobilisation	   for	   advocacy	   and	   such	  
organisations	   either	   entering	   or	   being	   captured	   by	   the	   political	   domain	   is	   a	   difficult	   one	   for	  
‘principals’	   to	  police.	  Both	  contending	  political	  parties,	  or	   factions,	  have	  been	  assiduous	   in	  co-­‐
opting	   other	   movements	   (especially	   youth	   and	   student	   ones,	   but	   also	   unions)	   into	   exclusive	  
agreements	   as	   front	   organisations.19	   This	   resembles,	   as	   noted	   earlier	   in	   the	   paper,	   the	  
Gramscian	   critique	   of	   civil	   society	   as	   providing	   support	   for	   authoritative	   regimes,	   i.e.	   as	   an	  
element	   of	   fascist	   political	   theory,	   rather	   than	   the	   de	   Tocqueville	   version	   of	   free	   standing	  
independence.20	   And	   other	   large	   organisations	   outside	   the	   state	   (NGOs)	   have	   chosen	   to	  
minimise	   the	   risk	   of	   boundary	   crossing	   or	   political	   attack	   for	   not	   accepting	   incorporation	   by	  
reducing	   their	   advocacy	   roles	   either	   to	   below	   the	   parapet	   or	   to	   technical	   rather	   than	   rights	  
arenas.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   become	   ineffectual	   in	   a	   governance	   sense	   of	   either	   access	  
transformation	  or	   accountability.	   The	   Press	   and	  other	  media	   organisations	   tread	   this	   fine	   line	  
between	  co-­‐option	  and	  the	  risks	  attendant	  upon	  being	  independent.	  
Holistic	  and	  Marginal	  Risk:	  Sustaining	  the	  Demand	  Side	  
Of	   course	   the	   governance	   agenda	   is	   about	   moving	   people	   from	   the	   condition	   of	   dependent	  
security	  to	  autonomous,	  rights	  based	  security,	  from	  limited	  to	  open	  access	  conditions.	  But	  from	  
the	  preceding	  analysis,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  demand	  side	  of	  governance	  incurs	  holistic	  not	   just	  
marginal	   risk	  for	  most	  people,	  especially	  for	  the	  poor.	  They	  are	  not	   in	  a	  social	  situation	  where	  
they	   can	   compartmentalise	   their	   lives—struggling	   in	   one	   bit	   of	   it,	   while	   kowtowing	   through	  
necessity	   in	  another	  bit.	  This	   is	   the	  meaning	  of	  Naomi	  Hossain’s	   ‘rude	  accountability’	  dilemma	  
(Hossain	   2010):	   outbursts	   of	   protests	   with	   rough	   language	   capable	   of	   being	   dismissed	   as	  
affective	  rather	  than	  affectively	  neutral	  behaviour21	  with	  no	  significance	  beyond	  the	  immediate	  
moment.	   Thus	   agents,	   as	   organisations	   or	   individuals,	   need	   to	   be	   continuously	   supported	   by	  
their	  principals—that	  is	  to	  have	  security	  of	  agency	  as	  the	  incentive	  to	  confront	  holistic	  risk,	  and	  
to	  move	   from	   rude	   to	   sustained	   accountabilty	   either	   short	   or	   long	   loop.22	   But	  what	   can	   that	  
continuous	   and	   predictable	   support	   mean	   in	   a	   closed	   limited	   access	   society	   (prison)	   with	  
interlocked,	   covariant	   relationships	   inside	   the	   perimeter	   fence?	   It	   is	   too	   easy	   to	   resort	   to	  
international	   donors	   as	   the	   ultimate	   principals	   in	   a	   principal-­‐agent	   cascade.	   Donors	   and	  
international	  human	  and	  political	  rights	  organisations	  can	  and	  should	  contribute	  to	  predictability	  
of	  support	  as	   long	  as	  they	  are	  prepared	  to	  shift	   from	  projectised	  time	  horizons	  to	   longer	  term	  
ones.	  That	  can	  be	  important	  signalling.	  But	  the	  necessity	  of	   long	  term	  predictability	  of	  support	  
by	  an	  NGO	   for	  people	  being	   locally	  mobilised	   into	   risky	   struggle	   and	   confrontation	   to	   achieve	  
accountability,	  means	   that	   the	   NGOs	   themselves	   need	   predictable	   support	   in	   some	  way	   over	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  This	  process	  of	  co-­‐opted	  inclusion	  has	  interesting	  implications	  for	  limited	  access	  thesis	  since	  it	  
represents	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  informal	  extension	  of	  access.	  
20	  The	  North,	  Wallis	  and	  Weingast	  (2009)	  differentiate	  between	  states	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  sponsorship	  of	  
organisations	  which	  manage	  access	  in	  some	  form.	  For	  the	  contrast	  between	  Gramscian	  and	  de	  
Tocquevillian	  perspectives,	  see	  Davis	  and	  McGregor	  (2000),	  and	  see	  also	  Woldring	  (2000)	  on	  de	  
Tocqueville’s	  approach	  to	  state	  and	  civil	  society.	  
21	  Parsons’	  pattern	  variables	  again.	  
22	  A	  useful	  distinction	  made	  by	  Harry	  Blair	  (2010)	  between	  the	  immediacy	  and	  intimacy	  of	  short	  loop	  in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  depersonalised	  remoteness	  of	  long	  loop	  accountability	  between	  providers	  of	  services	  and	  
the	  claimants	  of	  rights	  and	  entitlements.	  
Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  Bangladesh	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long	   periods.	   They	   need	   to	   be	   independent	   and	   free	   of	   the	   state	   and	   its	   key	   actors.	  
Sustainability,	   via	   independence	  and	   freedom,	   is	   thus	   a	  major	   issue	   in	   the	  mitigation	  of	   some	  
aspects	  of	  risk	   for	  both	  groups	  of	  poor	  people	  and	  the	  NGO	  activists	  who	  support	  them	  (since	  
they	   are	   at	   risk	   too).	   NGO	   workers	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   attack,	   along	   with	   their	   families.	   That	  
sustainability	   requires	   a	   broader	   ownership	   of	   ‘principal’	   status	   from	   among	   the	   emerging	  
middle	  classes	  of	  the	  country	  who	  have	  some	  resources	  and,	  perhaps	  via	  the	  spread	  of	  direct	  tax	  
nets,	  an	  interest	  in	  more	  active	  citizenship.23	  India,	  for	  example,	  has	  moved	  way	  beyond	  donor	  
dependency	  (if	  it	  ever	  had	  it)	  in	  this	  respect.	  
The	  PMUS24	  Case	  
To	  support	  the	  theoretical	  argument	  and	  the	  contextual	  analysis	  offered	  above	  for	  Bangladesh,	  
we	  offer	  here	  a	  case	  study,	  which	  in	  our	  experience	  are	  quite	  typical	  of	  the	  wider	  picture.	  The	  
case	   of	   PMUS	   refers	   to	   a	   large	   NGO	   created	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1970s	   and	   which	   had	   3	   decades	   of	  
expansion	  before	  entering	  a	  period	  of	  extended	  crisis	   from	  which	   it	  might	   currently	  be	   slowly	  
emerging.25	  	  
PMUS	  had	  a	  wide,	  national,	  grassroots	  presence,	  at	  one	  time	   in	  the	  early	  2000s	  this	  exceeded	  
even	   the	   reach	   of	   BRAC26,	  without	   having	   a	   similar	   HQ	   establishment	   or	   profile.	   It	   pursued	   a	  
strategy	  of	  group	  mobilisation	  and	  supported	  income	  generation	  alongside	  conscientisation	  and	  
empowerment	  objectives.	  It	  was	  innovative	  technologically	  especially	  in	  smallholder	  agriculture	  
and	  horticulture	  and	  developed	  a	  large-­‐scale	  microcredit,	  revolving	  loan	  fund,	  to	  support	  group	  
entrepreneurialism.	   Increasingly	   it	   federated	   these	   groups	   and	   entered	   local	   level	   politics	  
through	   its	  members	   competing	   in	   local	   government	   elections	   as	  well	   as	   via	   various	   forms	  of	  
protest.	  Nationally	   it	  reinforced	  this	  process	  by	  being	  a	  prominent	   leader	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  
Development	  Agencies	  in	  Bangladesh	  (ADAB);	  and	  by	  creating	  a	  think	  tank	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  to	  
promote	  broad	  civil	  society	  objectives	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  critiques	  of	  the	  annual	  budget	  from	  a	  
pro-­‐poor	   perspective.	   In	   this	   role,	   it	   participated	   in	   national	   and	   international	   seminars	   and	  
conferences,	   and	   attracted	   large	   scale	   funding	   from	   external	   donors.	   It	   appeared	   to	   be	   very	  
successful.	  It	  developed	  a	  large	  HQ,	  an	  attractive	  out	  of	  Dhaka	  'ashram'	  for	  its	  training	  sessions,	  
conferences	  and	  some	  action-­‐research.	  It	  also	  constructed	  a	  network	  of	  pucca	  area	  development	  
offices.	  In	  other	  words	  it	  acquired	  significant	  property.	  Up	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  it	  also	  appeared	  to	  
have	   independence	   from	   the	   state,	   partly	   because	   democratic	   politics	   only	   returned	   to	  
Bangladesh	   in	   the	   early	   1990s,	   and	   it	   managed	   to	   appear	   separate	   from	   and	   critical	   of	   the	  
military	   regimes,	   while	   operating	   and	   expanding	   under	   their	   patronage.	   This	   sense	   of	  
independence	  was	  also	  reinforced	  by	  having	  large	  and	  apparently	  secure	  flows	  of	  external	  donor	  
funding.	   However	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   NGO	   Affairs	   Bureau	   in	   1989,	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  A	  PhD	  student	  at	  Bath,	  Jens	  Stanislawski,	  is	  working	  on	  this	  side	  of	  the	  political	  equation.	  
24	  A	  thinly	  disguised	  acronym	  to	  provide	  some	  anonymity.	  
25	  I	  hope	  to	  add	  in	  a	  later	  version	  of	  this	  paper,	  a	  second	  case,	  Shammo,	  from	  Joe	  Devine.	  Shammo	  refers	  
to	  a	  smaller,	  more	  regionally	  focused	  NGO	  which	  emerged	  in	  the	  1980s	  but	  which	  too	  has	  declined	  amid	  
allegations	  of	  corruption	  and	  political	  infighting.	  
26	  Bringing	  Resources	  Across	  Communities	  (formally	  the	  Bangladesh	  Rural	  Advancement	  Committee)	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Ershad	   regime,	   was	   resented	   by	   PMUS	   as	   a	   controlling,	   regulatory	   intrusion.27	   It	   became	   a	  
warning	  of	  problems	  to	  come.	  
However	  beneath	  this	  formal	  picture	  of	  a	  separated	  and	  independent	  ‘estate’,	  the	  leadership	  of	  
PMUS	   could	   not	   divorce	   themselves	   and	   their	   organisation	   from	   the	   social	   interests	   in	   the	  
society	   around	   them.	  As	   part	   of	   extended	   kinship	   groups,	   they	   had	   relatives	   across	   the	   other	  
‘estates’	   and	   sectors	   in	   the	   society:	   the	   bureaucracy,	   the	   military,	   the	   police,	   universities,	  
judiciary,	  the	  media,	  banking,	  the	  manufacturing	  economy,	  property	  developers,	  and	  of	  course	  
political	   leaders	   of	   the	   suppressed	   and	   then	   emerging	   political	   parties.	   These	   and	   other	   links	  
entailed	   two	  way	   interaction.	   Jobs	   in	   PMUS	  were	   found	   for	   sons	   and	   daughters	   in	   return	   for	  
access,	   introductions	   and	   protection.	   Property	   deals	  were	   sealed	  with	   commissions.	  Mastaan	  
28were	   paid	   off	   to	   facilitate	   construction	   and	   quiescent	   labour.	   Senior	   bureaucrats	   and	   later	  
politicians	  were	  given	  favours	  to	  release	  land	  for	  development,	  and	  not	  to	  question	  too	  closely	  
the	   use	   of	   donor	   funds.	   Such	   linkages	   have	   their	   ethnographic	   roots	   as	   well	   as	   serving	   key	  
organisational	  objectives.	  It	  is	  a	  familiar	  tale	  of	  necessary	  cooption	  in	  an	  uncertain	  environment,	  
a	  tale	  made	  famous	  through	  Selznick's	  classic	  study	  of	  TVA	  and	  the	  Grassroots	  (1953).	  Thus	  in	  a	  
generic	   sense,	   the	   leaders	  of	  PMUS	  would	  not	  be	  doing	   their	   job	   if	   they	  were	  not	  engaged	   in	  
these	  various	  cooption	  practices.	  However	  the	  issue	  under	  the	  limited	  access	  state	  conditions	  of	  
Bangladesh	   is	   the	   nature	   of	   this	   institutional	   permeability.	   Do	   the	   practices	   of	   cooption	  
undermine	  the	  autonomy	  of	  CSOs	  and	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  ‘estates’?	  
These	  practices	  have	  intensified	  during	  the	  recent	  period	  of	  PMUS	  when	  it	  has	  been	  enduring	  an	  
extended	  crisis.	  The	  origins	  of	  this	  crisis	  derive	  from	  the	  explicit	  mission	  of	  PMUS	  that	   ‘politics	  
matter’	   in	   the	   removal	   of	   poverty.	   It	   is	   of	   course	   laudable	   that	   PMUS	   understood	   that	   the	  
reproduction	   of	   poverty	   was	   a	   function	   of	   class	   relations	   with	   political	   elites	   both	   protecting	  
propertied	   classes	   and	   themselves	   rent	   seeking	   across	   the	   economy.	   It	  was	   therefore	  broadly	  
comfortable	  with	  the	  proposition	  that	  to	  be	  effective	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  poor,	  the	  political	  arena	  
had	  to	  be	  entered	  in	  some	  way.	  Thus	  group	  mobilisation	  at	  the	  grassroots	  was	  increasingly	  seen	  
as	   the	   base	   of	   a	   pyramid,	   a	   large	   informal	   constituency	   to	   support	   the	   advocacy	   and	  
subsequently	  candidature	  in	  national	  elections	  of	  the	  principal	  leader.29	  	  
The	  first	  obvious	  foray	  occurred	  in	  the	  mid-­‐90s	  with	  a	  large	  rally	  in	  Dhaka,	  intervening	  essentially	  
on	   the	   side	   of	   the	   then	  opposition	   party,	   the	  Awami	   League,	   to	   overturn	   the	   bogus	   elections	  
held	   by	   the	   BNP	   in	   February	   1996.	   This	   effort	   was	   successful	   in	   that	   subsequent	   more	   valid	  
elections	  were	  held	  later	  in	  the	  year,	  bringing	  the	  AL	  to	  power	  for	  the	  1996-­‐2001	  period.	  	  PMUS	  
was	  now	  firmly	  tagged	  to	  the	  AL	  in	  the	  popular	  imagination,	  and	  indeed	  participated	  in	  various	  
ways	   in	   policy	   development,	   especially	   in	   relation	   to	   land	   access	   for	   the	   poor.	   PMUS	   and	   its	  
leader	   appeared	   to	   be	   strong	   as	   a	   result	   of	   this	   association,	   developing	   higher	   ambitions	   of	  
expansion	  and	  influence	  with	  the	  prospect	  of	  ongoing	  donor	  support	  and	  an	  expanding	  revolving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  This	  judgement	  was	  shared	  by	  the	  more	  critical	  NGOs,	  though	  Lewis	  (2010	  and	  2011)	  has	  a	  more	  
benign	  view	  of	  this	  relationship,	  reporting	  that	  ‘it	  is	  quite	  common	  for	  an	  NGO	  to	  employ	  at	  least	  one	  
reasonably	  senior	  former	  government	  official	  in	  order	  ensure	  that	  problems	  in	  working	  relationships	  can	  
be	  solved	  by	  using	  personal	  ties	  and	  channels	  of	  communication’	  (Lewis	  2011,	  p	  121).	  From	  this	  PMUS	  
case	  and	  other	  examples,	  such	  appointments	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  double-­‐edged!	  
28	  See	  footnote	  17	  above.	  (	  NB	  We	  tend	  not	  to	  pluralise	  words	  from	  Bangla,	  so	  this	  can	  be	  singular	  or	  
plural,	  and	  also	  refer	  to	  an	  institution.)	  
29	  He	  once	  told	  me	  of	  the	  necessity	  to	  put	  ‘muscle	  behind	  the	  policy’.	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loan	   fund	   supported	   by	   the	   Palli	   Karma-­‐Shayak	   Foundation	   (PKSF—a	  microcredit	   wholesaler).	  
But,	  as	  friends	  advised	  at	  the	  time,	  this	  strength	  was	  also	  a	  weakness.	  
With	   anti-­‐incumbent	   voting,	   the	   BNP	   returned	   to	   power,	   primus	   inter	   pares	   in	   a	   coalition	  
including	   Jamaat-­‐e-­‐Islami,	   in	   2001,	   with	   scores	   to	   settle,	   especially	   with	   PMUS.	   A	   period	   of	  
political	   harassment	   followed,	   entailing	   corruption	   charges	   against	   the	   PMUS	   leadership,	   and	  
especially	   its	   principal	   leader,	   now	   enjoying	   the	   self-­‐appointed	   title	   of	   President!	   In	   these	  
charges	   there	   were	   elements	   of	   truth,	   of	   ambiguity,	   and	   of	   invention-­‐-­‐but	   enough	   potential	  
truth	   to	   scare	   donors	   away	   and	   to	   suspend	   funds.	   Investigations	   and	   legal	   processes,	   indeed	  
entanglement,	   followed.	  The	  previous	  patronage	  of	   the	  AL	  was	  now	  a	  millstone,	  so	  protection	  
could	  only	  be	   sought	   through	  mobilising	  bureaucrats,	  other	  NGOs,	   think	   tanks,	   journalists	  and	  
seeking	  supportive	  links	  to	  lawyers,	   judges	  and	  military	  personnel.	  Pleas	  to	  donors	   increasingly	  
fell	  on	  deaf	  ears,	  apart	  from	  the	  EU	  whose	  own	  funds	  had	  anyway	  expired.	  
PMUS	  limped	  through	  to	  the	  coup	  in	  early	  2006,	  only	  to	  be	  included	  in	  a	  wider	  list	  of	  people	  and	  
organisations	   to	   be	   cleaned	   up.	   The	   elections	   in	   2008	   produced	   a	   landslide	   for	   the	   Awami	  
League,	  but	  alas	   for	   the	  PMUS	  President	  he	   lost	  his	  deposit	   in	  all	  of	   the	  3	  seats	  he	  contested,	  
having	  failed	  to	  get	  a	  AL	  ticket.	  This	  humiliation	  broke	  the	   leadership	  of	  PMUS	   into	  2	  principal	  
opposing	  factions:	  led	  by,	  on	  the	  one	  side,	  the	  President;	  and,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  his	  deputy	  (the	  
Vice-­‐President).	  This	  split	  and	  subsequent	  intense	  competition	  for	  control	  of	  PMUS	  and	  its	  brand	  
was	  prompted	  by	  a	  nervous	  Board	  finally	  getting	  the	  courage	  to	  vote	  off	   its	  Chairman,	  namely	  
the	   President/Chief	   Executive.	   The	   'charge'	   was	   essentially	   bringing	   PMUS	   into	   disrepute	   by	  
using	   it	   to	   support	   his	   increasingly	   personalised	   ambitions	   to	   enter	   politics	   and	   the	   Jatiyo	  
Sangsad,	  and,	  further,	  pursuing	  this	  agenda	  over	  many	  years	  with	  donor	  funding.	  Thus	  the	  Board	  
had	   finally	   overcome	   its	   loyalty	   and	   shared	   the	   formal,	   GOB	   critique,	   actually	   shared	   by	   both	  
leading	   parties,	   that	   the	   de	   facto	   use	   of	   external	   donor	   funds	   to	   build	   up	   a	   constituency	   of	  
electoral	   support	   was	   fraudulent	   and	   anti-­‐nationalist.	   Of	   course	   the	   ousted	   leader	   hotly	  
contested	   this	   critique,	   referring	   to	   his	   right	   as	   a	   citizen	   to	   enter	   politics.	   This	   claim	   was	  
simultaneously	  undermined	  by	  allegations	  of	  personal	  corruption.	  
This	  story,	  as	  related	  so	  far,	  might	  imply	  that	  representatives	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  political	  class	  
wanted	   separation	   between	   the	   state	   and	   such	   organisations	   in	   the	   civil	   society	   domain.	  
However,	   this	   is	   not	   the	  main	   lesson	   to	   be	   drawn,	   as	   subsequent	   events	   further	   reveal.	   The	  
factional	   struggle	   between	   the	   contenders	   for	   control	   over	   PMUS	   over	   the	   last	   3	   years	   has	  
required	   these	   contenders	   to	   recruit	   support	   from	   various	   elements	   of	   the	   state	   and	  political	  
class.	  This	  process	  of	   cooption	  was	   initiated	  by	   the	  ex-­‐President,	  deploying	  his	  erstwhile	   links,	  
albeit	  informal	  ones,	  with	  mastaan,	  goons30	  and	  local	  police	  to	  attempt	  a	  physical	  re-­‐occupation	  
of	   the	   HQ	   building	   in	   Dhaka.	   Protection	   for	   such	   attempts	   required	   the	   hidden,	   high-­‐level	  
support	  of	  close	  relatives	  of	  the	  Prime	  Minister.	  With	  this	  knowledge,	  judges	  in	  the	  lower	  courts	  
were	  influenced	  along	  with	  the	  police	  to	  turn	  a	  blind	  eye	  to	  this	  violence.	  To	  compete,	  the	  acting	  
replacement	  leader	  (i.e.	  the	  erstwhile	  Vice-­‐President)	  had	  to	  imitate	  this	  behaviour	  and	  open	  up	  
matching	  contacts	  with	  the	  political	  class,	  and	  be	  prepared	  to	  mobilise	  funds	  for	  the	  legal	  costs	  
of	   repetitive	   cases	   in	   successively	   higher	   courts.	   In	   return,	   places	   on	   the	   Board	   had	   to	   be	   re-­‐
allocated	  to	  political	  nominees	  to	  ensure	  political	  management	  of	  PMUS	  in	  the	  future.	  Thus	  this	  
process	  of	  factional	  struggle	  has	  ensnared	  both	  contenders	  and	  their	  respective	  supporters	  in	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  A	  more	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  term	  for	  thugs.	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ever-­‐increasing	  dependency	  upon	  both	  the	  governing	  party,	  but	  also	  functionaries	  in	  the	  state.	  
And	   of	   course,	   it	   has	   been	   necessary	   for	   the	   occupying	   leadership	   of	   PMUS	   to	   keep	   lines	   of	  
communication	   and	   support	  open	   to	   the	  opposition	  party,	   BNP;	  being	   realistically	   fearful	   of	   a	  
repeat	  of	   the	  earlier	  harassment	   should	   it	   return	   to	  power.	  By	  being	  unable	   to	   separate	   itself	  
from	   the	  patronage	  of	   the	   ruling	  party,	   any	   long-­‐term	  survival	  of	  PMUS	   requires	   it	  now	   to	  be	  
close	  to	  both	  parties,	  and	  thus	  deeply	  entangled	  with	  the	  state.	  
What	  is	  interesting,	  and	  key	  to	  our	  argument,	  is	  that	  this	  entanglement	  and	  thereby	  subversion	  
of	   autonomy	   does	   not	   arouse	   more	   perceptions	   of	   shock	   and	   horror	   among	   observers	   in	  
Bangladesh.	   The	   explanation	   for	   this	   lies	   in	   the	   'prison'	   metaphor	   (Wood	   2000).	   Some	   NGOs	  
have	   uncomfortably	   similar	   stories	   and	   thus	   cannot	   credibly	   throw	   stones	   from	   their	  
glasshouses.	  Others	  have	  more	   subtly	   and	  quietly	  nurtured	   their	   support	   among	   the	  different	  
factions	  and	  branches	  of	  the	  political	  class	  and	  senior	  functionaries	  of	  the	  state	  through	  Board	  
memberships,	  through	  actual	  senior	  appointments	  in	  their	  organisations,	  especially	  for	  recently	  
retired	  senior	  officers,	  as	  observed	  by	  Lewis	  (2011).	  Young	  relatives,	  whose	  family	  connections	  
have	  ensured	  them	  a	  good	  education,	  have	  had	  starts	  on	  their	  career	  ladder	  with	  NGOs,	  which	  
are	  now	  highly	  professionalised,	  offering	  decent	  salaries	  and	  prospects.	  Foreign	  trips,	   logistical	  
support,	  and	  links	  to	  overseas	  appointments	  as	  well	  as	  the	  donor	  community	  have	  all	  been	  on	  
offer	  to	  such	  state	  cooptees.	  Direct	  payments	  via	  NGOs	  using	  donor	  funds	  are	  harder	  to	  track,	  
though	  the	  allegations	  and	  popular	  assumptions	  are	  rife.	  Thus	  both	  crisis,	  and	  the	  management	  
of	  crisis	  avoidance,	  demands	  this	  entanglement.	  
What	  are	  the	  wider	  structural	  implications	  of	  this	  entanglement?	  NGOs,	  the	  hundreds	  of	  them	  in	  
Bangladesh,	  are	  both	  a	  threat	  and	  an	  opportunity	  for	  political	  classes	  managing	  a	  limited	  access	  
state.	   In	   threat	   terms,	   they	   can	   potentially	   mobilise	   an	   alternative	   constituency,	   especially	   if	  
supplied	   with	   non-­‐state	   funds	   thus	   undermining	   the	   state's	   monopoly	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	  
resources	   and	   positional	   goods,	   and	   its	   collective/coalition	   monopoly	   of	   rent	   seeking.	   NGO	  
constituencies	  have	  demonstrated	   their	  weakness	   in	  open	  electoral	   terms,	   so	   far,	   and	  anyone	  
who	   has	   attempted	   to	   launch	   a	   meaningful	   third	   force	   political	   party	   has	   been	   rapidly	   and	  
explicitly	   suppressed,	   even	   if	   led	   by	   Nobel	   Prize	   winners!31	   This	   is	   a	   very	   obvious	   process	   of	  
limiting	   access	   to	   prospects	   of	   political	   office,	   and	  maintaining	   a	   strict	   control	   of	   that	   access.	  
Indeed	   the	   two	   main	   contending	   parties,	   or	   more	   accurately	   political	   factions,	   are	   strongly	  
focused	   upon	   delegitimising	   the	   claims	   of	   their	   respective	   opponents	   to	   democratic	   political	  
status.	  The	  spoils	  are	  not	  to	  be	  shared,	  if	  at	  all	  possible.	  However,	  the	  prospect	  of	  being	  out	  of	  
office	  does	  temper	  the	  behaviour	  while	  actually	  in	  office!	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  This	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  the	  founder	  of	  the	  Grameen	  Bank,	  who	  has	  twice	  tried	  to	  enter	  the	  political	  arena	  
on	  a	  technocrat	  ticket.	  The	  first	  time,	  with	  2	  other	  well-­‐established	  senior	  NGO	  players,	  was	  towards	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  Ershad	  period,	  offering	  in	  effect	  a	  lifeline	  to	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  military-­‐bureaucratic	  
oligarchy.	  More	  recently	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Interim	  Government	  in	  late	  2007	  he	  tried	  again	  to	  form	  a	  
party	  of	  technocrats,	  but	  gave	  up	  after	  two	  months	  of	  very	  negative	  media	  coverage.	  His	  move	  attracted	  
the	  deep	  hostility	  of	  political	  incumbents	  who	  have	  subsequently	  managed	  to	  remove	  him	  from	  the	  
leadership	  of	  the	  Grameen	  Bank	  and	  undermining	  his	  reputation	  through	  allegations	  of	  financial	  
impropriety.	  In	  other	  words,	  like	  the	  leader	  of	  PMUs,	  he	  has	  been	  punished	  for	  trying,	  in	  Northian	  terms,	  
to	  widen	  the	  limited	  access	  coalition.	  
Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  Bangladesh	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We	   have	   proceeded	   from	   an	   assumption	   that	   an	   autonomously	   functioning	   civil	   society	   is	  
essential	   for	   the	   governance	   and	   accountability	   dimensions	   of	   democracy	   and	   thereby	  
addressing	   the	  generic	  problem	  of	  democratic	  deficit	   in	  most	   societies	  of	   the	  world.	  We	  have	  
explored	  this	  widespread	  problem	  through	  the	  case	  of	  Bangladesh,	  famous	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  for	  
the	   vibrancy	   of	   its	   development	   NGO	   sector	   while	   still	   emerging	   from	   an	   agrarian	   past,	  
characterised	  by	  patron-­‐client	  hierarchies,	  social	  deference	  and	  unaccountable	  elite	  domination.	  
Although	   NGOs	   are	   not	   synonomous	   with	   civil	   society,	   we	   have	   referred	   to	   the	   case	   of	   a	  
significant	  development	  NGO	  	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  intricacies	  of	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  
natural,	  limited	  access	  state	  and	  its	  actors.	  We	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  relationships	  circumscribe	  
their	   room	   for	  manoeuvre,	   even	   when	   they	   are	   apparently	   challenging	   the	   state.	   So	   the	   key	  
question	   to	   pose	   is:	   can	   we	   envisage	   a	   change	   in	   these	   conditions	   so	   that	   civil	   society	   does	  
become	  free	  of	  the	  state?	  	  
North	   et	   al	   (p148	   and	   passim)	   argue	   for	   what	   they	   term	   ‘doorstep’	   conditions	   enabling	   a	  
transition	  from	  limited	  to	  open	  access	  societies.	  The	  crux	  of	  these	  conditions	  is	  a	  shift	  towards	  
impersonality	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   for	   elites.	   This	   is	   combined	   with	   ‘perpetually	   lived	  
organisations	  in	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres’	  (i.e.	  organisations	  that	  can	  exist	   independently	  
of	   personalised	   elite	   patronage	   and	   incorporation)	   and	   ‘consolidated	   control	   of	   the	  military’.	  
They	  also	  cite	  the	  work	  of	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  in	  the	  Economic	  Origins	  of	  Dictatorship	  and	  
Democracy	   (2006)32	   who	   paradoxically	   argue:	   ‘Because	   the	   elite	   loses	   under	   democracy	   it	  
naturally	  has	  an	   incentive	   to	  oppose	  or	   subvert	   it;	   yet,	  most	  democracies	  arise	  when	   they	  are	  
created	   by	   the	   elite.’	   The	   easiest	   way	   to	   present	   the	   apparent	   paradox	   of	   Acemoglu	   and	  
Robinson’s	  observation	   is	   through	  elite	  perceptions	  of	   the	  need	   to	  make	  concessions	   to	  other	  
classes	   seeking	   access	   rather	   than	   risk	   losing	   everything	   through	   clinging	   to	   elitist,	   highly	  
exclusionary	  power.	  In	  other	  words,	  for	  elites	  a	  controlled	  tranistion	  to	  democratic,	  open	  access	  
conditions	   in	  which	   they	   still	   significantly	   share	  power	   is	   preferable	   to	   revolutionary	  upheaval	  
which	  might	  sweep	  away	  their	  rents	  and	  privileges.	  
So	  how	  might	  this	  work	  in	  Bangladesh?	  The	  first	  observation	  is	  that	  nouveau	  riche,	  urban	  middle	  
classes	   are	   growing	   rapidly	   so	   that	   longer	   standing	   elites	   have	   to	  make	   room	   for	   them,	   thus	  
shifting	   the	   society	   from	   fragile	   to	   somewhere	   between	   basic	   and	   mature	   natural	   state	  
conditions.	  Secondly,	   the	  threat	   from	  a	  growing	  aspirant	  but	  substantially	  excluded,	  urbanised	  
lower	  middle/working	  class	  is	  palpable.	  Thus	  mastaan	  management	  of	  such	  emergent	  classes	  on	  
behalf	   of	   elites	   is	   unstable	   and	   unpredictable.	   Thirdly,	   a	   neo-­‐Marxian	   mobilisation	   of	   poor	  
peasant	  classes	  via	  NGO	  or	  other	  movement	   intermediaries	   is	  now	  highly	  unlikely,	  despite	   the	  
past	   4	   decades	   of	   radical	   orthodoxy,	   since	   they	   have	   been	   successfully	   contained	   by	   a	  
combination	   of	  mastaanised	   forms	  of	   cascading	   patronage	   (as	   a	   substitute	   for	   previous	   semi-­‐
feudal	   mechanisms	   of	   incorporated	   control)	   and	   migratory	   safety	   valves	   (either	   in	   overseas	  
labour	  markets	  or	  internal	  urbanisation).	  And	  fourthly,	  crucially	  for	  the	  key	  doorstep	  condition,	  
there	   will	   be	   a	   shift	   over	   the	   next	   decade	   along	   the	   personal	   identity	   scale	   from	   specific	  
individuals	   (and	   their	   families	   and	   intimate	   associates)	   to	   social	   persona.	   In	   other	  words,	   not	  
only	   is	  Bangladesh	  at	   a	  demographic	   conjuncture	   regarding	   threats	   to	  elites,	  but	   also	   facing	  a	  
succession	  crisis	   in	  both	  main	  political	   factions.	  This	   time	  fact	  alone	  heralds	  the	  prospect	  of	  at	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  This	  title	  is	  a	  play	  on	  Barrington-­‐Moore’s	  famous	  Social	  Origins	  of	  Dictatorship	  and	  Democracy,	  1968.	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least	   partially	   fulfilling	   the	   key	   doorstep	   condition	   of	   some	   shift	   towards	   impersonality33	   and,	  
with	  that	  shift,	  a	  stronger	  rule	  of	  law	  for	  elites.	  
But	   do	   these	   4	   observations	   represent	   a	   sufficient	   combined	   ‘doorstep’	   condition?	   Are	   they	  
enough	   for	   ruling	   elites	   to	   accommodate	   other	   classes	   into	   a	   wider	   political	   space,	  managed	  
through	  codified	  norms	  and	  rules	  offering	  autonomy	  for	  organisations	  of	  civil	  society	  rather	  than	  
through	   continued	   use	   of	   	  mastaanised	   processes?	   However,	   with	   a	   few	   notable	   and	   noble	  
exceptions	  of	  relative	  independence	  and	  autonomy34,	  most	  organisations35	  and	  corporations36	  in	  
Bangladesh	   are	   a	   long	   way	   from	   freeing	   themselves	   from	   current	   forms	   of	   political	  
incorporation.	   The	   military	   is	   a	   long	   way	   from	   consolidated,	   civilian	   control.	   The	   judiciary	   is	  
highly	   contaminated.	  Millenarian	   options	   associated	  with	   Islamic	   fundamentalism	   are	   close	   at	  
hand	  for	  populist	  management	  of	  the	  excluded,	  volatile,	  urban	  declasse.	  Educational	  provision,	  
and	  thus	   ideas	  about	  citizenship	  under	  open	  access	  conditions,	   remains	  pitiful	  and	  reproduces	  
exclusion	   or,	   at	   best,	   adverse	   incorporation.	   Market	   transactions	   remain	   highly	   imperfect	  
through	  non-­‐transparent	  social	  and	  cultural	  variables.	  Labour	  remains	  pre-­‐commoditised	  (Wood	  
and	  Gough	  2006).	  The	  spheres	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  life	  thus	  remain	  interlocked.	  
It	  is	  highly	  possible,	  then,	  that	  Bangladesh	  will	  continue	  with	  its	  mastaan	  forms	  of	  capitalism37,	  
that	  a	  shift	  to	  impersonality	  will	  be	  incomplete	  for	  at	  least	  another	  generation38,	  and	  that	  rising	  
populist	   threats	   to	   elite	   (albeit	   enlarged	   and	   accomodating)	   rent-­‐seeking	   will	   be	   managed	  
through	  a	   combination	  of	   fascist	  millenarianism,	   interspersed	  with	  military	   coups.	  Donors	  and	  
the	   few	   local,	   open	   access	   oriented	   escapees39,	   will	   continue	   to	   wring	   their	   hands	   from	   the	  
sidelines.	   Though,	   to	   return	   to	   an	   earlier	   point,	   we	   should	   not	   see	   this	   set	   of	   conditions	   and	  
consequent	  outcomes	  as	  hegemonically	   locked	   in.	  The	  structural	  contradictions	  are	  present	   to	  
enable	  ongoing	  struggle	  and	  contestation.	  Although	  the	  ‘springs’	  in	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  
East	  have	  yet	  to	  run	  their	  course	  into	  a	  pleasant	  summer,	  they	  are	  indicative	  of	  the	  proposition	  
that	   limited	  access,	  natural	   states	  are	  ultimately	  unstable	   in	  a	  modern	  world	  of	  migration	  and	  
global	   communications	  where	   elites	   steadily	   lose	   their	  monopoly	   of	   control	   over	   information.	  
The	  widening	   knowledge	  of	   open	   access,	   democratic	  models	   elsewhere	   can	   act	   as	   a	   driver	   of	  	  
internal	  movements	   for	  positive	  change,	  movements	  especially	  populated	  by	  emerging	  middle	  
classes	  with	  a	  growing	  stake	  in	  how	  the	  society	  should	  be	  run.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Though	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Nehru	  dynasty	  in	  India	  and	  the	  precarious	  survival	  of	  the	  Bhutto	  one	  in	  
Pakistan	  makes	  one	  less	  optimistic	  about	  this	  aspect	  of	  transition	  in	  Bangladesh.	  
34	  BRAC,	  The	  Daily	  Star	  and	  TIB	  come	  to	  mind.	  
35	  Including	  NGOs	  and	  trades	  unions.	  
36	  Including	  the	  media	  and	  other	  industries.	  
37	  Ha-­‐Joon	  Chang	  from	  LSE	  writes	  about	  different	  forms	  of	  capitalism	  reflecting	  different	  histories	  and	  
socio-­‐political	  circumstances	  (e.g.	  The	  Guardian	  16.11.11)	  rather	  like	  Wood	  and	  Gough’s	  historically	  
rooted	  and	  specific	  welfare	  regimes	  (2006).	  
38	  A	  remember,	  with	  an	  extended	  mastaan	  structure,	  the	  personality	  issue	  exists	  all	  the	  way	  down	  to	  the	  
grassroots	  in	  daily	  face	  to	  face	  encounters	  as	  a	  problem	  of	  succession.	  
39	  From	  the	  prison.	  
Can	  civil	  society	  be	  free	  of	  the	  natural	  state?	  Applying	  North	  to	  Bangladesh	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